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The answer is yes. By using a unique and large data set on overdraft contracts between banks and microfirms
and self-employed individuals, we find robust evidence that women in Italy pay more for overdraft
facilities than men. We could not find any evidence that women are riskier then men. The male/female
differential remains even after controlling for a large number of characteristics of the type of business,
the borrower and the market structure of the credit market. The result is not driven by women using
a different type of bank than men, since the same bank charges different rates to male and female borrowers.
Social capital does play a role: high levels of trust loosen credit conditions by lowering interest rates,
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In Italy, microrms and self employment are especially common, and bank
overdraft facilities (or credit lines) are an important source of credit for liq-
uidity provisions. Self-employed women and microrms owned by women
comprise more than 25 percent of the total.1
We take advantage of a unique data set on all overdraft facilities used
by the self-employed and microrms in Italy, and we nd that women pay a
higher interest rate than men, after controlling for a host of personal char-
acteristics, characteristics of the business and characteristics of local credit
markets. An obvious explanation could be that women are riskier borrowers,
but the result remains strong after controlling for a variety of risk factors,
including past credit history of the individual borrower, the sector in which
the borrower operates and his/her type of activity. In fact, female-owned
businesses have gone bankrupt signicantly less often than male-owned, and
women have a slightly better credit history.
The result holds unchanged when we include bank xed eects: therefore,
it cannot be explained by the fact that women use a specic type of bank.
We also nd that rms asked to pledge collateral are charged higher interest,
since they are perceived as more risky. Interestingly, we nd that, when a
woman has a male guarantor, her interest rate goes down, rather than up,
while if a female borrower has a female guarantor, her interest rate is much
higher even than that of a male/male pair. A woman guaranteed by a woman
is considered the absolute worst possible borrower by banks.
In order to further investigate the role of trust and risk, we consider social
capital in dierent parts of Italy and its eects on credit relationship. As
a large literature has discussed, the level of trust varies dramatically across
provinces in Italy, and this correlates to a host of socio-economic outcomes.2
1Even if female participation rates in the labor market have been increasing over time,
reaching 46 percent in 2006, Italy is still lagging behind other European countries (the EU
average is more than 57 percent).
2Pathbreaking work by Putnam (1993) made the point, and recent work by Guiso
Sapienza and Zinagles (2007) deepened the argument in important ways. For related work
2We show that interest rates charged for these overdraft facilities are lower
in places with higher social capital and trust, and this robust result is of
interest in its own right. The dierential between female and male rates,
however, is not an artifact of low social capital. In fact, when we look at the
interaction of measures of social capital and the gender of the borrower, we
nd that women benet from the trust eect of increased social capital less
than men. In other words, both men and women pay relatively less in places
with more trust, but women benet less than men from this eect. We have
also investigated whether the structure of the bank industry matters, for
instance with more fragmentation in the system beneting women (perhaps
because of more competition), and whether the presence of small banks, for
which duciary and personal relationships with the clients matter, would
benet women. We did not nd much. Women pay more with any structure
of the banking sector.
Are women then discriminated against in credit markets in Italy? First of
all, we need to distinguish between statistical and taste-based discrimination.
The rst category implies that lenders nd women to be more risky than men,
and consequently a lender, even if not biased against women, would rationally
charge a higher interest to them. Taste discrimination simply implies that
lenders, holding risk constant, charge more to women because they are biased
against them. We could not uncover any evidence than women are riskier
than men in Italy, and in our regression, we try to control as well as we
can for risk factors. Incidentally, note that the literature on microcredit in
developing countries pointed out that women are signicantly more reliable
borrowers than men (see Armendariz and Morduch (2005) for a survey),
even though it is not clear whether these results extend outside the context
of very poor countries. However, it is possible that we are not fully capturing
risk factors, and banks may know more than the econometricians about why
women are riskier than men.
The alternative explanation is that women are taste-discriminated against
on Europe, see Tabellini (2006).
3by banks: namely, banks view women as less desirable clients simply because
they are women. Unfortunately, we do not have data on credit applications,
approvals and denials, which could provide additional evidence regarding this
eect.
Amongst OECD countries, Italy is towards the extreme in terms of view-
ing women in a \traditional" role, as recently shown in Alesina and Giuliano
(2007). These authors point out that, in cultures where family ties are strong
(as they are in Italy), the family is based on the more traditional roles of a
male bread earner and a woman running the household. These cultural traits
are especially strong in the south of Italy.3 However, our results on interest
rates on women are not driven by the behavior of the south; rather, they are
pervasive.
While taste discrimination is likely to be more common in a society which
views women \traditionally," one has to be constantly reminded of the Beck-
erian (Becker 1961) critique: that is, in our context, if some banks discrim-
inate against women because they have a taste for it (i.e., they are willing
to leave expected prots on the table to favor men over women), why don't
other banks enter the market and make extra-prots by not discriminat-
ing? Banks run by women may be more likely to be averse to gender-based
discrimination, but note that the presence of women on boards of banks is
minimal in Italy.
The literature on discrimination in credit markets focuses mostly on racial
discrimination in the US, and needless to say, the topic is hotly debated
and politically charged. Cavalluzzo and Cavalluzzo (1998) and Blanchower,
Levine and Zimmerman (2003) review this debate and provide evidence that
they claim is consistent with discrimination against African-Americans in
the market for small business loans. They focus not on interest rates charged
but on denials of credit applications.4 Ravina (2008) presents evidence on US
data of taste-based discrimination in the credit market: personal character-
3See the pathbreaking work by Baneld (1958) on this point.
4See also Cole (1999), Calomiris, Khan and Longhofer (1994) and Lundberg and Starz
(1998)
4istics like beauty (in addition to race) seem correlated with credit conditions,
even though they are not correlated with repayment records. These results
are generally consistent with those of Bertrand, Karlan, Mullainhatan, Shar
and Zinnerman (2005). Similar results are routinely found in labor markets.5
The organization of the paper is simple. In the next section, we describe
our data sources and present some summary statistics. In Section 3, we
show our results on female versus male interest rate dierentials. Section 4
investigates the role of trust and social capital, and the last section discusses
the results and concludes the paper.
2 Data
2.1 Sources
While there is no internationally recognized denition of \woman entrepreneur"
or \female-run rm," the denition used by countries to disseminate data on
male and female entrepreneurship includes concepts such as owners, man-
agers, the self-employed and employers. For the purposes of the present
paper, we rely on the sole proprietorship rm, because in this instance, it is
straightforward to identify the owner's gender.
The data used in our empirical analysis come from two main sources: a)
the Central Credit Register (Centrale dei Rischi) run by the Bank of Italy,
containing detailed information on rms and individuals whose loans are
above the threshold level of e75,000 and b) the Bank of Italy Loan Interest
Rate Survey, including information on interest rates charged on each bank
loan granted by a sample of about 200 Italian banks. This sample is highly
representative of the Italian market for loans to small rms. These banks
account for over 80 percent of the total lending granted to self employed
and microrms. Furthermore, the sample is representative of the universe of
Italian banks in terms of bank size, category and location.
5See Altonji and Blank (1999) for a survey and Bertrand and Mullainhatan (2004) for
some recent evidence obtained in an imaginative way.
5We focus on overdraft facilities (i.e., credit lines) for three reasons.6 First
of all, for very small rms and self-employed individuals, overdraft facilities
are the main form of credit and liquidity management. Second, since these
loans are highly standardized among banks, we are sure that the comparison
between the cost of credit among rms is not aected by unobservable (to
the econometrician) loan-contract-specic covenants. This is not the case for
mortgages, for which we cannot observe the exact maturity of the loan, the
loan-to-value ratio and other eventual loan characteristics. Third, overdraft
facilities are loans that are granted neither for some specic purpose, as is
the case for mortgages, nor on the basis of a specic trade transaction, as
is the case for advances against trade credit receivables. As a consequence,
according to Berger and Udell (1995), the pricing of these loans is highly
associated with the borrower-lender relationship, thus providing us with a
better tool for testing gender discrimination. After a careful cleaning proce-
dure, we end up with a sample of 1.2 million loans to nearly 150 thousand
rms for 12 quarters, from January 2004 to December 2006.7
2.2 Summary Statistics
In Table 1, we dene all the variables used below. Table 2 shows the gender
composition of our data by rms and loan contracts and by regions of Italy:
North-East, North-West, Center and South. The fraction of female-owned
businesses is about 18 percent of the total, and the fraction of loans for these
businesses is slightly less, at 16 percent. This may hint at the possibility of
6A credit line is a contract that allows a borrower to take advantage of a predetermined
\line limit" and repay it at the borrower's discretion with an interest rate periodically set
by the bank. Whenever the drawn credit exceeds the line limit, the bank charges a penalty
interest rate.
7Data on credit lines have been trimmed to the 1-99 percentiles of the interest rate
distribution. Also, we excluded from the sample those rms that are recipients of govern-
ment subsidies, since those rms are likely to face a subsidized interest rate. Moreover,
this exclusion enables us to rule out the possibility of having those \marginal" rms that
wouldn't enter the market without a subsidy and/or that may be listed in a woman's name
just to receive some kind of state aid.
6a higher denial ratio for women, but we do not have these data, especially if
we recall that one rm out of four is female-run, according to the business
register. Interestingly, the share of female businesses is very similar between
the north and south of Italy, and the geographic distribution of shares is
similar, even though there are of course more rms in the more populated
north of Italy. Note that female entrepreneurial rates are especially large in
the south compared to labor participation rates. In any event, our results
are not driven by observations in the south.
Table 3 illustrates the sectorial composition of the borrowers. Not surpris-
ingly, women and men are not distributed evenly in all sectors; for instance,
women are almost non-existent in construction but make up more than a
third of the tourist industry. Needless to say, we control for sectors in our
regression below, and in fact, we have a much-rened denition of sectors in
our estimates. Table 4 illustrates data on the size of credit lines. Credit lines
to women tend to be smaller: the rst two columns of this table show that
about 65 percent of loans to women are in the smaller category, versus 55
percent of loans to men. Table 5 shows that the average drawn from credit
line in absolute value is similar between men and women, but women draw
a slightly higher share of their lines. Table 6 shows that a higher percentage
of loans to women are accompanied by external guarantees, often a person
guarantor. We have also checked whether, on average, women are worse bor-
rowers. In our data set, we have an indicator variable for the presence of
bad loans, dened in Table 1, which captures whether the borrower has had
a history of some sort of bad credit. The numbers are slightly higher for
men than for women, 0.46 versus 0.44 percent. If we look at the underlying
number of rms, we nd that 1.1 percent of female rms have a bad credit
history, while for males, the gure is 1.3 percent.
Unfortunately, we do not have data on bankruptcies; however, we have
them for the universe of Italian rms obtained from from the Chamber of
Commerce, the Italian business register. It turns out that, in 2004, female
sole proprietorship rms had a lower failure rate than male rms: 1.9 vs.
72.2 (the failure rate is dened as the ratio of the number of rms with an
outstanding bankruptcy procedure to the total number of active rms). If
we take a broader denition of failure rates, which accounts for liquidations
also, the gures are even more clear: the failure rate for female rms is 4.9
percent, and the one for males is 6.0. Accordingly, there is no evidence that
rms owned by women tend to go bankrupt more than rms owned by men.8
In summary, female rms are roughly equally distributed as shares of the
total across Italy, women-owned businesses obtain somewhat smaller loans
and women seem to have a better credit history then men on average and
are less likely to go bankrupt. Nevertheless, more women are asked to post
a guarantee when they obtain a loan.
3 Results
3.1 Basic Regressions
Table 7 presents our basic results. All the columns include industry, time and
province xed eects. A province is a locality in Italy more or less equivalent
to a non-sparsely-populated county in the US. In the period under exam,
there were 103 provinces in Italy with a minimum of 89 thousand and a
maximum of 3.5 million inhabitants.
The left-hand variable is the interest rate, expressed as the dierence
between the observed interest rate and the ECB marginal rate on lending
facilities (in the period we consider, 2004-2006, the average interest rate paid
on overdraft facilities is, in our sample, around 9 percent). We include a set
of 148 industry dummies (3-digits SIC code) and 12 quarterly time dummies.
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the rm level.
In the rst column, we control only for the gender of the borrower, in
addition to the dummies listed above, and we nd that female borrowers pay
about 29 basis points more than men with the coecient signicant at the
8See also Lotti (2007).
81 percent level. In column (2), we repeate the same regression, adding bank
xed eects. The coecient on the female variable is virtually identical to
that of the rst column. This shows that the eect on female rate is not
due to the fact that females choose systematically dierent types of banks
relative to men. As a further robustness check, column (3) contains the
same specications as (1), estimated by means of panel techniques.9 As
expected, the coecient for the female dummy is higher but unchanged in its
magnitude. Secondly, in column (4), we control for a few other determinants
typically related to rm riskiness, dened above in Table 1 (like all other
variables).10 The coecient of the dummy for craftsmen is negative, but
it is not signicant when bank xed eects are put in the regression: this
nding is consistent with the hypothesis that craftsmen may take advantage
of a preferential treatment with specialized lenders. The coecient of the
borrower's age variable shows that younger individuals are considered more
risky by bank and pay a higher interest rate, because age is commonly viewed
as the amount of public information available about the rm.11 We also
looked at the quadratic term on age: the estimated coecient turned out
to be positive but very small, suggesting very old borrowers paying more.
Our coecient of interest on the female variable was unchanged. Note that
the average age of borrowers is 48 for women and 50 for men: thus, very
similar. Third, we include a proxy for rm size, i.e. the size of the rm's
total debt, and we nd that rms with a larger amount of outstanding loans
pay a lower rate, presumably because these are, to some extent, larger rms
with higher bargaining power in setting the loan terms. In fact, the amount
of the requested loan is strongly correlated with the rm's incentives to look
9We use a random eect panel, since a xed eect model would wipe out all time-
invariant characteristics, like the owner's gender. Nevertheless, with such a short time
span, especially if compared to the large number of observation, we did not nd any
signicant time eect in the regression (see Pesaran and Yamagata (2008) for testing
issues in large panels).
10Firm characteristics included in our regressions are quite standard in the banking
literature; see Berger and Udell (1995) or Petersen and Rajan (1995), among others.
11See Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Berger and Udell (1995).
9for a lower price for credit (Stigler, 1961).
Fourth, past episodes of insolvency lead to higher interest rates, not sur-
prisingly. The coecient on the variable of interest (female) remains positive
and signicant at the one percent level; it falls in magnitude, but the female
penalties remain close to 20 basis points.12 We have also investigated whether
the age eect is dierent from men and women, possibly because of mater-
nity, but we found no indication that the interest rate dierential is charged
on women of childbearing age.13
Column (4) repeats the regression of column (3) but includes bank xed
eects. As for the case of column (2) versus (1), the introduction of bank
xed eects hardly changes the coecient on females. We have repeated
all the regressions that we report below using bank xed eects, and we
always nd the same result: the coecient on the female variable is virtually
unaected. We report below results without bank xed eects; the other one
are available from the authors. Given the large sample size, we could estimate
the same basic specication separately for broadly dened industries. As one
can see from Table A1 in the appendix, the coecient of the dummy female
is lower in the hospitality industry (0.1) and higher in the credit & insurance
intermediation sector (0.4).
3.2 Men and Female Guarantors
Sometimes banks remand a guarantor in order to agree to a credit line con-
tract. Presumably, they do so when they worry about the solvency of the
borrower. As we discussed above, women seem to have fewer bankruptcies
and better credit histories, but a larger fraction of women borrowers are
asked for a guarantor.
Table 8 investigates the role of male and female guarantors relative to the
12We also added all these variables one at a time. The results on our coecient of
interest are robust, and the control variables added one at a time have the same sign and
signicance as in column (2).
13Results on this point are available upon request.
10gender of the borrower. In column (1), we show that borrowers with guar-
antors pay higher interest rates because they are considered more risky by
lenders and having a guarantor does not fully compensate for this fact. Col-
umn (2) shows that this eect is driven by male borrowers: they pay more if
they have a guarantor, but females with a guarantor pay less. This suggests
that, while a man with a guarantor is considered more risky, a woman is con-
sidered less risky. The last two columns are quite instructive and suggestive.
They show that, when a female borrower has a male guarantor, she pays sub-
stantially less, but when a female borrower has a female guarantor, she pays
a lot more! That is, a female borrower with a female guarantor is viewed by
the banks as the worst type of client. A female borrower guaranteed by a
female pays nearly 43 basis points more than a non-guaranteed man and 62
more than a woman guaranteed by a man.
3.3 Market Structure
The previous section's results on the gender of guarantors are suggestive of
some form of preference of lenders for male borrowers and guarantors. If
this is the case, according to Becker's (1961) argument, new entrants in the
lending market would take advantage of the opportunity to cash in on the
prots. We rst looked at whether, with a signicant presence of females
in their boards, banks are less prone to charge female clients more, perhaps
because a more gender-balanced board is sensitive to issues of potential gen-
der discrimination. However, the presence of females in banks' boards is very
limited. A very small fraction of loans are made by banks in which the num-
ber of females in their board goes beyond 2 or 3, clearly a small minority. A
large fraction of loans (more than 71 percent) is made by banks with an all
male board. When we run our regressions adding a dummy for banks with
at least one or more female member of the board, we did not nd much of
an eect on the interest dierential between male and female borrowers, as
reported in Table 9.
In Table 10, we investigate the eect of the structure of lending markets,
11dened as provinces. In column (1), we introduce a standard measure of
concentration of the market, the Herndahl index (HHI). The results show
that interest rates are lower in more concentrated markets. In column (2),
we add a quadratic term that shows that interest rates are lowest in mar-
kets with an intermediate level of concentration. This nding is consistent
with the empirical results provided by Petersen and Rajan (1995) and more
recently by Degryse and Ongena (2007): namely, the fact that, in more con-
centrated markets, banks tend to invest more in a relationship-based kind of
lending and charge lower interest rates. In other words, in highly competi-
tive markets, banks have a lower incentive on acquiring information on their
potential borrowers and rank them as risky. When the degree of concen-
tration increases, banks are more prone to establish long-term relationships
with borrowers, and this lowers interest rates.
Given the U-shaped relationship between interest rates and concentra-
tion, the interest rate decreases until it reaches its minimum around the 96th
percentile of the HHI distribution. In very highly concentrated credit mar-
kets, it grows again. The interaction of the Herndahl index and female is
negative, showing that women actually pay less in more concentrated mar-
kets. Thus, to the extent that more competition is associated with a lower
Herndahl index, it does not appear that this reduces the male versus female
rate dierences; in fact, it increases it.14 For women, going from the 25th
to the 75th percentile of the HHI distribution (i.e., for increasing levels of
market concentration), the interest rate decreases, on average, by 13 basis
points.
In the last column, we control for the failure rate at the province level,
and obviously, we drop the province xed eects in this specication. Women
still pay a higher interest rate, but the interaction of failure rates and female
borrowers is negative, indicating that women pay a lower dierential relative
to men in provinces with higher failures. This result is somewhat hard to
14In this specication, we did not include the quadratic term on the Herndahl index
to facilitate the interpretation of the interaction term.
12interpret, but if one believes that females generally pay more because they are
considered riskier, above and beyond all the controls which we have in these
regressions, one might expect that, in a riskier environment, the dierential
between male and female borrowers should go up, not down. This piece of
evidence indirectly casts some doubts on an explanation of the interest rate
dierential based on dierential risk.
Perhaps women are less wealthy than men, both in terms of total wealth
and in terms of expected wages on the labor market, so that if a woman
defaults, the bank would expect to collects less. In other words, even if
males and females do not exhibit dierent default probabilities, still there
may be a dierence in terms of \loss given default" (LGD, i.e., the expected
loss in case of default). We do not have data on assets of the borrower. In
order to address this issue, we examined data on credit write-os as a proxy
of the LGD: these are bad loans that banks categorize as foregone, since
their cost of recollection is higher than the outstanding debt. It turns out
that, in the period under exam (2004-2006), males exhibit a higher share of
non-collectible bad debt (6.2 vs 4.8 percent).
4 Social Capital and Interest Rates
Dierences in the level of social capital and trust within dierent parts of
Italy have been the subject of a lively literature. The \classic" treatment
is in Putnam (1993), while Guiso Sapienza and Zingales (2007) provide a
recent in-depth analysis. Social capital and dierent levels of trust may be
associated with more or less \secure" relationships between a borrower and
a bank. Thus, in a place with higher trust, a bank may charge lower interest
rates. In this subsection, we investigate whether this is the case and whether
the male/female rate dierential is present only in low social capital places
and is the result of lack of generalized trust.
A cursory look at the data already suggests that it is unlikely that the
male/female dierential is present only in low social capital places. In fact,
13we observe that the male/female rate dierential is positive in the north,
center and south of Italy, while the level of social capital is very dierent in
the three places (higher in the North and Center and lower in the South).15
But the data display signicant variations in the level of social capital even
within these three regions, and therefore further investigation is presented
in Table 11. The rst three columns simply add three measures of social
capital to our basic regression. The rst column uses the log of the number
of newspapers per thousand individuals, a variable which may capture not
only social capital but also level of education. The second uses the number
of blood donations in the province, while the third is based on the number of
members of sport associations, two widely used measures of social capital.16
All three measures of social capital enter negatively with a strong degree of
statistical signicance in the regressions. More social capital and trust bring
about lower rates of interest. Moving from the 25th percentile of the social
capital distribution to the 75th, the interest rates decrease by approximately
20 basis points.
The coecient on female rates, however, remains unchanged and, in
fact, almost identical to what we had obtained in Table 6. In the next three
columns, we add the failure rate in the province, which, as before and not
surprisingly, enters positively. However, the coecient on social capital does
not change at all. Therefore, the explanation for the eect of social capital
cannot be that failure rates are lower with more social capital. There is an
eect of social capital that goes beyond that. In fact, failure rates and social
capital are not especially highly correlated. If the female/male dierential
were driven mostly or exclusively by provinces with low social capital, the
coecient on the female dummy should go down when we control for social
capital. It does not. As a further check, in Table 12, we add an interaction
term between social capital and female. The sign is positive, indicating that
social capital reduces rates on all borrowers but more on men than on women.
15Results for previous regressions run for dierent parts of Italy are available upon
request.
16See, for instance, Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2007) and Cartocci (2007).
14In other words, the benecial eect of social capital is unevenly distributed
across genders.
This result highlights the possibility that some businesses may be listed in
the name of women because, in the past, their husbands or relatives had credit
problems or a business failure, because in Italy, until 2006, the bankruptcy
law hindered the owner of a failed business to restart a rm for a period up
to ve years. It is impossible to control for that, but these \grey" practices
are more likely to occur in places with lower social capital. We nd no sign
that the male/female rate dierential is concentrated only in places with
low social capital. Also, presumably it would not be too dicult for the
lender to check on this possible doubtful practice. Moreover, in statistical
terms, \sham" business listings aimed at covering individuals with previous
failure records are more likely to happen in those areas where business failure
rates are higher. In Table 10, we control for province-specic failure rates:
interacting this variable with the female dummy, we get a negative coecient,
meaning that in provinces with higher failure rates, female rms pay lower
interest rates than the female average. It's in that interaction that fraudulent
listings are more likely to be found, but since we get a negative estimate, we
are condent that their economic impact would be negligible, if it exists at
all. As a further check, we have excluded from the sample those rms whose
proprietor has co-signed a loan with someone who has defaulted in the period
under exam and one year prior. Some of these rms are likely to be sham
listings. Still, female rms pay 30 basis points more than men.
5 Discussion and Conclusions
We have examined the pattern of lending rates on overdraft facilities in Italy
with a unique and large data set. This borrowing channel is especially im-
portant for the self-employed and micro rms, which, in Italy, are especially
numerous relative to other OECD countries. We document that women pay
a higher interest rate even after controlling for a host of characteristics of the
15borrower, the bank and the structure of the banking sector. In fact, we nd
that the same bank charges more to women than men, so the result cannot
be explained by women using dierent types of bank than men. We have
tried to control as well as we could for risk factors like type of business, past
credit history and the presence of guarantors, but the dierential remains.
Incidentally, women-owned businesses display a lower failure rate than male-
owned ones in Italy. We also nd that, in places with higher social capital
and trust, banks charge lower interest, and the amount of this eect is quite
large, but the dierential between male and female borrowing rates is not
conned in places with low social capital. Both men and women pay lower
interest in places with high social capital, but women benet less.
The result is very robust. One interpretation is statistical discrimination,
women being riskier than men. But we nd that, on average, women show a
better history then men in terms of past episodes of bad loans or bankrupt-
cies. Guarantors are considered a risk factor for men: male borrowers are
charged more if they have to post a guarantor. For women, is the opposite:
when they post a male guarantor, their interest goes down, but, interestingly,
if they have a female guarantor, the interest they pay goes way up. It would
appear that even the gender of guarantor is considered a risk factor for banks,
pointing out again the presence of some degree of taste-based discrimination.
As discussed above, we could not explain the male versus female dierential
with many variables meant to capture dierential risk, but it is possible that
a bank has more information than the econometrician.
If the male/female dierential is purely taste-driven, why wouldn't banks
with dierent preferences enter the market to capitalize on this prot op-
portunity? Dierent measures of market concentration that may proxy for
entry barrier do not seem to help explain the dierential. Banks with female
boards may be especially prone not to have gender-based preferences, but in
Italian bank boards, the presence of women is minimal.
In summary, we are left with the following result: women pay more than
men in Italy for overdraft facilities, and this dierence does not seem to be
16explained by any variable capturing dierential risk, directly or indirectly.
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18Table 1: Variable names and denitions.
Firm specic variable Description Source
Rate Interest rate charged to rm i by bank j, expressed
as a dierence between the observed interest rate and the Loan Interest Rate Survey
ECB marginal rate on lending facilities.
Female Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the owner's gender Central Credit Register
is female (0 if male).
Craftsmen Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the rm is registered Central Credit Register
as \artisan" (0 if not).
Age Proprietor's age (in log). Central Credit Register
Loan size Size of rms' total outstanding loans, in 9 classes Central Credit Register
(1=75; 2=[75; 125], 3=[125; 250], 4=[250; 500],
5=[500; 1,000], 6=[1,000; 2,500], 7=[2,500; 5,000],
8=[5,000; 25,000], 9=25,000. In thousand e).
Bad loans Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the the rm had Central Credit Register
insolvency problems (0 if not).
Guarantor Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the rm is required Central Credit Register
external collateral to secure its loans (backed up by
physical and/or nancial assets posted by a third party).
Female guarantor Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the external Central Credit Register
guarantor is female.
Male guarantor Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the external Central Credit Register
guarantor is male.
Bank specic variables Description Source
Female Auditor Dummy variable that takes value 1 if at least one of the Supervisory Report
bank' auditors is female.
Female Managing Director Dummy variable that takes value 1 if at least one of the Supervisory Report
bank' managing directors is female.
Market specic variables Description Source
HHI Herndahl-Hirschman concentration index, Supervisory Report
market shares computed on loans to enterprises.
Failure rate Firms' failure rate, i.e. the ratio of rms with an Infocamere
outstanding bankruptcy procedure to the total number
of active rms.
Newspapers Number of newspapers (excl. sport) per th. persons, in log. Carocci (2007)
Blood donations Number of blood donations, per th. persons, in log. Carocci (2007)
Membership in Sport Association Number of members of sport associations per th. persons, Carocci (2007)
in log.
19Table 2: Firms and credit lines: geographical distribution (in %).
Firms Credit lines
Female Male Female Male
North East 17.2 82.8 15.4 84.6
North West 16.8 83.2 14.8 85.2
Center 20.4 79.6 18.0 82.0
South & Islands 18.3 81.7 16.9 83.1
Total 18.0 82.0 16.1 83.9
Table 3: Firms and credit lines: sectorial distribution (in %).
Share of rms Share of loans
Female Male Female Male
Manufacturing 17.9 82.1 15.8 84.2
Constructions 2.8 97.2 2.5 97.5
Retail & Wholesale trade 25.1 74.9 22.9 77.1
Hotels & Restaurants 34.3 65.7 32.8 67.2
Credit & Insurance interm. (excl. banks) 6.9 93.1 6.4 93.6
Business Services 17.0 83.0 14.3 85.7
Total 18.0 82.0 16.1 83.9
20Table 4: Credit lines' size (in e).
Global loans size a Share of credit lines, in % Av. granted credit per line, in e
Female Male Female Male
Below 250,000 65.1 55.5 34,060 36,850
Between 250,000 and 2,500,000 34.2 42.7 84,889 83,388
Between 2,500,000 and 100,000,000 0.7 1.8 253,401 305,205
Total 100 100 53,048 61,511
a Global loan size refers to the rms' total outstanding loans.
Table 5: Average credit drawn per line (in e).
Global loans size a Average drawn credit per line, in e Credit line usage b
Female Male Female Male
Below 250,000 27,840 28,749 81.7 78.0
Between 250,000 and 2,500,000 59,757 59,886 70.5 71.9
Between 2,500,000 and 100,000,000 177,526 219,884 70.0 72.1
Total 39,850 45,455 75.2 73.9
a Global loan size refers to the rms' total outstanding loans.
b The credit line usage is the ratio of drawn to granted credit, in %.
21Table 6: Share of secured loans (in%).
Global loans size a Share of secured credit lines b
Female Male
Below 250,000 58.0 54.0
Between 250,000 and 2,500,000 60.0 53.8
Between 2,500,000 and 100,000,000 62.0 42.9
Total 58.7 53.7
a Global loan size refers to the rms' total outstanding loans.
b Secured loans are backed up by either physical and nancial assets






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































23Table 8: Interest rates and third party secured loans.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female 0.280*** 0.382*** 0.395*** 0.246***







Female * Guarantor -0.183***
(0.032)
Female * Male Guarantor -0.426***
(0.040)
Female * Female Guarantor 0.428***
(0.062)
N. obs. 1,209,078 1,209,078 1,209,078 1,209,078
All regressions control for industry, time and province xed eects. Standard errors are
robust and clustered at the rm level.
* = signicant at 10%, ** = signicant at 5%, *** = signicant at 1% .
24Table 9: Interest rates and banks' board of directors.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female 0.284*** 0.295*** 0.285*** 0.282***
(0.019) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019)
Female Auditor -0.145*** -0.135***
(0.015) (0.016)
Female Managing Director -0.009*** -0.018
(0.021) (0.022)
Female * Female Auditor -0.058
(0.038)
Female * Female Managing Director 0.053
(0.054)
N. obs. 1,209,078 1,209,078 1,209,078 1,209,078
All regressions control for industry, time and province xed eects. Standard errors are
robust and clustered at the rm level.
* = signicant at 10%, ** = signicant at 5%, *** = signicant at 1% .
25Table 10: Interest rates and credit markets' characteristics.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Female 0.285*** 0.285*** 0.286*** 0.354*** 0.422***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.040) (0.041)




Failure ratea 0.153*** 0.158***
(0.003) (0.004)
Female * HHI -0.904**
(0.449)
Female * Failure rate -0.032***
(0.008)
N. obs. 1,209,078 1,209,078 1,209,078 1,209,078 1,209,078
All regressions control for industry, time and province xed eects. Standard errors are
robust and clustered at the rm level.
* = signicant at 10%, ** = signicant at 5%, *** = signicant at 1%.



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































27Table 12: Interest rates and social capital: interactions.
(1) (2) (3)
Female -0.154 -0.080 -0.145
(0.179) (0.184) (0.161)
Female * N. of newspapers 0.099**
(0.041)
Female * Blood Donations 0.112*
(0.057)
Female * Sport associations 0.103***
(0.039)
N. obs. 1,209,078 1,209,078 1,209,078
All regressions control for industry and time xed eects. Province xed eects
not included. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the rm level.
* = signicant at 10%, ** = signicant at 5%, *** = signicant at 1%.
28Appendix
Table A.1: Interest rates and industries.
Industry (1) (2) % of credit lines
held by Females
Manufacturing 0.323*** 0.215*** 24.96
(0.013) (0.013)
Constructions 0.590*** 0.407*** 2.99
(0.034) (0.034)
Retail & Wholesale trade 0.216*** 0.122*** 50.30
(0.009) (0.009)
Hotels & Restaurants 0.120*** 0.099*** 11.80
(0.020) (0.020)
Credit & Insurance interm. (excl. banks) 0.523*** 0.422*** 2.40
(0.039) (0.038)
Business Services 0.519*** 0.356*** 7.55
(0.023) (0.023)
(1) and (2) are the same specications as in Table 7, column (1) and (4) respectively.
Only \female" dummy coecients are reported.
All regressions control for 3-digits industry and time xed eects.
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the rm level.
* = signicant at 10%, ** = signicant at 5%, *** = signicant at 1%.
29